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This report aims to provide the payment industry and regulators with analytical outcomes on retail cross-border payments (CBPs) based upon empirical market observations. It comes with a view to offering a reference point to make an informed decision before taking an inaugural step toward a business project or a regulatory initiative. This report examines recent developments in retail CBPs and explores their implications from an industry and market perspective. The analysis was carried out with a particular focus on three supply-side arrangements: correspondent banking, interlinking, and private stablecoins, the three keystone species in the global retail CBPs ecosystem.
The payment market, and retail CBPs in particular, represents a unique domain in the sense that neither an industry business model nor a public initiative alone can create a sustainable ecosystem, no matter how ingenious or ideal it may be. It is not uncommon for a promising industry project to be abandoned due to regulatory concerns, or for a public initiative pursuing the common good to be eventually obscured by its lack of self-sustaining commercial viability. Moreover, the heterogeneous and idiosyncratic nature of the PSPs servicing retail CBPs, along with the evolving traits of the underlying technology, often create material gaps between established understanding and actual industry practices. In light of this, the three supply-side retail CBP arrangements examined in this report deserve particular attention, as the latest operational snapshot demonstrates these critical gaps.
First and foremost, the traditional pain points of retail CBPs—namely, days of processing time accompanied by additive cost accumulation—can no longer be used as universal defining characteristics of correspondent banking because of recent service enhancements implemented by commercial banks and SWIFT. As long as banks maintain a sufficient prefunded nostro balance with their correspondent institutions and customer data is judged legitimate, end-to-end retail CBPs can be processed within an hour or even minutes, unless banks operate additional, highly conservative layers of internal control. This finding is particularly relevant to retail CBPs executed in reserve currencies, namely the USD, and certain local currencies (LCs) that support a bank's core business model, which is attributable to the reality that the vast majority of banks operate active nostro prefunding arrangements for these currencies to fulfill high customer payment demand.
Consequently, alarming double-digit fee levels relative to the principal payment and multi-day processing times are most likely to be pertinent to jurisdictions in marginalized areas, which are frequently serviced by multiple layers of local intermediaries inundated with inconsistent local regulations. This structural implication suggests that correspondent banking can be significantly improved by revamping regulatory standards or a bank¡¯s internal rules to remove redundant procedures and administrative formalities. For instance, banks and regulators should consider reviewing whether existing AML/CFT or FX standards have become overly conservative or outdated in view of current industry practices, and take the necessary corrective steps. Any subsequent remedial actions can shift retail CBPs onto faster, lower-cost rails even without relying on futuristic blockchain technology or tokenization.
Interlinking—whether bilateral or multilateral—suggests an effective solution to address retail CBP pain points, particularly within certain local currency corridors that are heavily afflicted by material administrative and messaging frictions. Current or prospective interlinking arrangements indeed offer immediate enhancements to retail CBPs in the areas of processing speed and end-user convenience by directly connecting the retail payment systems (RPSs) of the jurisdictions concerned, thereby allowing PSPs to ensure the elimination of intermediary layers. Counterintuitively, however, what actually keeps an interlinking arrangement running is the prefunded nostro liquidity of each settlement bank (SB) rather than the direct connection of the RPSs itself. This critical aspect is operationally invisible and therefore frequently overlooked, despite the fact that it functions as an unavoidable upward pressure on SB capital costs.
The magnitude of this upward pressure becomes even greater for an SB in an originating country whose outbound payments systemically and significantly exceed its inbound flows, as that institution is likely to be placed in a state of permanent nostro drain. This implication suggests that a regulator¡¯s leadership, driven by the goodwill of moving public payment systems forward, may bring about severe unintended consequences—a spectacular front-end performance masking the reality of an SB within its own jurisdiction serving as a permanent liquidity donor, silently bleeding capital all year round. In light of this, an in-depth analysis that quantifies the potential net liquidity drain through a rigorous public-private partnership is a prerequisite, not an option, before taking an inaugural step toward interlinking.
To conclude with a vital point, it is important to recognize that the game-changing nature of a stablecoin arrangement (SA) lies neither in blockchain technology nor programmability, but in the economic liberation of capital from legacy prefunding constraints, achieved through organized market arrangements. By shifting from a prefunded to a Just in time (JIT) liquidity model, SAs render the traditional, capital-intensive correspondent network structurally obsolete. Despite the absence of comprehensive, comparable numeric data, the strong potential of SA-based PSPs ultimately suggests faster and more convenient retail CBPs with lower costs compared to the services offered by traditional correspondent banking or interlinking hubs.
Gaining structural tailwinds from the GENIUS Act, which provides legal certainty and a level playing field with traditional financial institutions, global SAs servicing USD tokens are increasingly embracing compliance and FX regulations to further strengthen their primary upper hand: operational agility across public blockchain networks and their surrounding ecosystems. This dynamic introduces a distinct competitive exclusion pressure for dominance within the global payment market, directly pitting conventional banks employing tokenized deposits on private blockchains against SA PSPs leveraging private stablecoins on public blockchain networks.
Admittedly, the current snapshot of this ecosystem remains blurred; it is difficult to foresee exactly how specific retail CBP niches will be partitioned—or which realized niches will eventually emerge—over the coming decades. Given the enormous capital efficiency potential of private SAs coupled with the inherent uncertainty surrounding their future trajectories, however, it appears sensible and practical for industry participants and regulators outside of U.S. territory to actively explore regulatory measures and technical conduits, with a view toward harmonizing local payment infrastructures with new forms of privately circulated digital dollars.
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